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I. INTRODUCTION
Modern spacecraft (as well as most other complex mech-
anisms like aircraft, automobiles, and chemical plants) rely
more and more on software, to a point where software failures
have caused severe accidents and loss of missions. Software
failures during a manned mission can cause loss of life, so
there are severe requirements to make the software as safe
and reliable as possible. Typically, verification and validation
(V&V) has the task of making sure that all software errors
are found before the software is deployed and that it always
conforms to the requirements. Experience, however, shows that
this gold standard of error-free software cannot be reached in
practice. Even if the software alone is free of glitches, its
interoperation with the hardware (e.g., with sensors or actua-
tors) can cause problems. Unexpected operational conditions
or changes in the environment may ultimately cause a software
system to fail. Is there a way to surmount this problem?
In most modern aircraft and many automobiles, hardware
such as central electrical, mechanical, and hydraulic compo-
nents are monitored by IVHM (Integrated Vehicle Health Man-
agement) systems. These systems can recognize, isolate, and
identify faults and failures, both those that already occurred
as well as imminent ones. With the help of diagnostics and
prognostics, appropriate mitigation strategies can be selected
(replacement or repair, switch to redundant systems, etc.).
In this short paper, we discuss some challenges and promis-
ing techniques for software health management (SWHM).
In particular, we identify unique challenges for preventing
software failure in systems which involve both software and
hardware components. We then present our classifications
of techniques related to SWHM. These classifications are
performed based on dimensions of interest to both developers
and users of the techniques, and hopefully provide a map for
dealing with software faults and failures.
II. CHALLENGES
In principle, there is no reason why software components
could not be “hooked up” to an IVHM system tailored for
software monitoring. Such an IVHM system could operate in
a similar way to a traditional IVHM system, but would focus
its attention on the software. However, there are substantial
differences between physical systems and software systems.
These differences calls for special approaches for preventing
software failure, which is the ultimate goal of SWHM. In
particular, the challenges stemming from differences between
physical and software systems include the following issues:
Software errors do not develop over time, they are intro-
duced as flaws and errors in all stages of the software
life-cycle. Requirements errors, design flaws, and coding
errors are just a few examples. If errors are not detected
and removed during testing, they remain (dormant) in
the software system and can show up during operation.
Software errors also do not ”go away” on their own.
Failures in software most often occur due to problematic
interoperation with the hardware. Hardware systems (and
their sensors) might behave differently than expected, and
thus could cause software failure. Such a different behav-
ior could be on purpose 1 , by accident during development
(e.g., replacement of a sensor or instrument shortly before
launch [1]), as a result of a hardware failure (broken
sensor cable), disabled sensor (e.g., broken capacitor on
Deep Space 1’s star tracker), or gradual degradation (e.g.,
signal noise increases beyond the specified level and
causes the software to behave erratically). Since physical
systems can misbehave in various ways, it is extremely
difficult to maintain software health in the presence of
physical anomalies.
In contrast to many hardware failures, which occur grad-
ually (e.g., decrease in oil pressure due to a leak), most
software failures occur instantaneously. The reason for
this is that most of the software is discrete (state ma-
chines, decision logic) and usually cannot be described or
reasonably approximated by continuous modeling tech-
niques. So, systems dealing with software failure are
under more pressure to predict potential failures and to
1In Ariane V several software modules from the smaller Ariane IV had
been re-used. However, the range of certain sensor values was larger (due to
different physical dimensions and construction), which led to an uncaught
overflow error, causing the rocket to behave erratically and required its
destruction.
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Technique	 I Fault handling I FDIR	 Automation	 Resources	 Completeness
Design and programming methodologies (development phase)
Model-based design fault prevention N/A N/A N/A N/A
Goal-based operations fault prevention N/A N/A N/A N/A
Aspect-oriented programming fault prevention N/A N/A N/A N/A
Recovery-based computing fault prevention N/A N/A N/A N/A
Software configuration management fault prevention N/A N/A N/A N/A
Verification and Validation (V&V) (testing phase)
Testing fault removal N/A manual, semi-automatic adjustable No
Simulation fault removal N/A automatic moderate-high No
Debugging fault removal N/A semi-automatic varied No
Numerical analysis fault removal N/A manual low No
Model checking fault removal N/A automatic high In some cases
Theorem proving fault removal N/A automatic high In some cases
Runtime techniques (post-deployment phase)
Redundancy-based fault tolerance fault tolerance isolation,recovery automatic varied No
Checkpointing and rolling back fault tolerance recovery automatic varied No
Runtime monitoring fault tolerance detection automatic minimal No
Trace analysis fault tolerance detection automatic varied No
Built-in tests fault tolerance detection automatic minimal No
Software rejuvenation fault tolerance recovery automatic minimal No
Computer immunology fault tolerance detection,isolation automatic usually minimal No
Self-healing software fault tolerance detection,isolation,recovery automatic varied No
TABLE I
CLASSIFICATIONS OF SOFTWARE HEALTH MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES.
with respect to the handling of faulty software-hardware
interactions.
. only few techniques can be demonstrated to be cor-
rect and reliable, addressing the issue that the SWHM-
software is a safety-critical piece of software itself.
We hope this work will shed light on some strengths and
weaknesses of SWHM approaches proposed in the literature
of related areas of study. The presented classifications should
also allow researchers and users to gain better understanding
of the current state of this new and exciting field.
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